This paper examines the illusion of value generated by the booking of accounting goodwill and its impact as a driver of top line and bottom line growth in an otherwise satiated market. "Packaging is everything" is the popular phrase. "It holds truth regarding the illusion of value."
Introduction
This paper reviews the accounting rules (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles -GAAP) regarding goodwill, asset impairment, profit maximization and the sustainability paradigm relative to the life cycle phenomenon. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) under its accounting authority, specifically in its Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) governing the accounting for goodwill, sections 350-10, 350-20 and subtopic 850-30 , addresses the issues of, and issues associated with, goodwill.
In particular, paragraph ASC 350-10-05-1 provides guidance on financial accounting and reporting related to goodwill. Paragraph ASC 850-30-30-1) Measurement of Goodwill, posits: …the acquirer shall recognize goodwill as of the acquisition date, measured as the excess of (a) over (b) where (a) is the aggregate of the consideration transferred; the fair value of any non controlling interest in the acquired; the business combination achieved in stages and (b) is the net of the acquisition-date amounts of the identifiable assets acquired and the liabilities assumed measured in accordance with this Topic.
The Accounting Standard Codification (ASC 350-10-20) also describes Goodwill, "…as an asset representing the future economic benefits arising from other assets acquired in a business combination or an acquisition by a notfor-profit entity that are not individually identified and separately recognized."
In simpler terms, goodwill is a long term asset of an intangible nature that arises when a company acquires another business in its entirety. Goodwill is calculated as follows:
Or, even more simply, goodwill is the net asset value of assets acquired in excess of their Fair Market Value that cannot be individually identified.
Facts and Historical Points -The Rules
Many of the issues in dealing with goodwill arose when the former Accounting Principles Board (predecessor to the Financial Accounting Standards Board -FASB) in its Opinion APB No. 16, 'Business Combinations', permitted two methods of accounting for acquisitions: 1) the purchase acquisition rule where goodwill had to be calculated, and 2) the pooling acquisition rule which permitted firms to simply merge like kind account balances (no write-up of asset values to fair market value). APB 16 required the pooling method to be used, but then laid out a series of rules which were difficult for firms to meet in adopting the pooling method. Unless all the pooling combination rules could be met, the purchase method had to be used. The effect was many firms had to use the purchase method for business combinations. APB No. 16 was superseded with the FASB issuance of its Statement No. 141, 'Business Combinations', which only permitted the purchase method to be used for accounting for business acquisitions. To date, the purchase method of accounting for business combinations stands. The rules for goodwill, APB 17, 'Intangible Assets', required this asset class to be expensed via systematic amortization. But, superseding APB 17, SFAS 142, 'Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets' required the use of the impairment charge method of expensing Goodwill. That is, goodwill was not to be ratably amortized anymore; rather it was to henceforth be impaired. That is, it was not to be expensed unless and until impairment occurs. The old goodwill rules required goodwill to be systematically amortized (expensed) over no more than 40 years. The challenge here is that the impairment rules in force today provide wide discretion in determining when and if goodwill becomes impaired. To this end, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Project Update draft for amending the impairment rules made on September 12, 2016, appears to still provide wide discretion in the calculation of any goodwill impairment. (FASB, 2016) .
Additionally, FASB Concepts Statement 2 (CON 2), (May 1990) , Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, in paragraphs 91 -93, addresses the matter of making the conservative choice when deciding accounting matters.
91.
Nothing has yet been said about conservatism, a convention that many accountants believe to be appropriate in making accounting decisions. To quote APB Statement 4: Frequently, assets and liabilities are measured in a context of significant uncertainties. Historically, managers, investors, and accountants have generally preferred that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net assets. This has led to the convention of conservatism. . . . [Paragraph 171] 92. There is a place for a convention such as conservatism-meaning prudence-in financial accounting and reporting, because business and economic activities are surrounded by uncertainty, but it needs to be applied with care. Since a preference "that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net assets" introduces a bias into financial reporting, conservatism tends to conflict with Significant qualitative characteristics, such as representational faithfulness, neutrality, and comparability (including consistency). 93. Conservatism in financial reporting should no longer connote deliberate, consistent understatement of net assets and profits. The Board emphasizes that point because conservatism has long been identified with the idea that deliberate understatement is a virtue. That notion became deeply ingrained and is still in evidence despite efforts over the past 40 years to change it. The convention of conservatism, which was once commonly expressed in the admonition to "anticipate no profits but anticipate all losses," developed during a time when balance sheets were considered the primary (and often only) financial statement, and details of profits or other operating results were rarely provided outside business enterprises. To the bankers or other lenders who were the principal external users of financial statements, understatement for its own sake became widely considered to be desirable, since the greater the understatement of assets the greater the margin of safety the assets provided as security for loans or other debts.
Discussion of the Issues
In recent times, we see a tremendous growth in the appearance of goodwill on the balance sheets of many companies in order to show top line and bottom line growth in an otherwise satiated market. Such acquisitions often result in material goodwill appearing on the balance sheet as a percent of total assets and/or off balance sheet market values. It was reported in The Wall Street Journal that companies in the U.S. could have recorded more than $8 trillion in intangible assets (including goodwill) according to Leonard Nakamura of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2016). Monga states, "… that's nearly half of the combined $17.9 trillion market capitalization of the S&P 500 index (Monga 2016) . Bernard Condon of Associated Press (2016) indicates that goodwill on the balance sheets of the Standard & Poor's 500 index ballooned to $2.5 trillion. "That is 50% more than at the end of the last deal boom in 2007 according to FactSet," (Condon, 2016) . Part of this move to recording large goodwill and intangible amounts on balance sheets may be driven in part by CON 2, para 3, as noted above. Paragraph 3 seems to alter past practices in determining the choice of values to be recorded.
The effect of the move to booking large goodwill amounts according to data provided by R.G. Associates, a research firm that focuses on accounting matters, shows that in 2002 following a surge in acquisitions, writedowns cut pre-tax earnings by 21%, while goodwill write downs in the twelve months following the end of 2007 reduced S&P 500 earnings by more than 38% (Condon, 2016) .
Condon further identifies the issues with goodwill values. He posits that the average premium over market prices offered by acquirers in 2015 was 38%, and for health care companies, the premium offered was 57% (Condon, 2016) . The below Figure 2 presents reported goodwill of a number of large public firms as a percent of market value.
Figure 2: Goodwill as a Percent of Market Value
Source: (Thurm, 2012) In a similar study by Nugent et al (2016), the top 100 largest companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges were examined relative to comparing goodwill to total assets. Out of the top 100 firms, 14 firms were eliminated as having financial statements significantly different from the remaining 86 firms. Those eliminated firms were principally banks and insurance companies. A list of the 86 firms remaining and data from their latest 10Ks filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission through June 15, 2016 appears as Appendix A.
In Appendix A, it can be seen that 27 of the 86 firms examined had goodwill measuring more than 20% of total assets, with 12 firms having goodwill in excess of 30% of total assets, and 3 with goodwill in excess of 40% of total assets. Viewing one large firm that has been in the news of late, AT&T, it can be seen AT&T As an asset, goodwill appears to help the acquirer in sustaining the appearance of increasing enterprise value via increased assets, and in the firm's ability to show top and bottom line increases through additional revenues with no concomitant penalty in the form of additional expenses (goodwill impairment/expenses). What develops is a pattern of constraints wherein a primary, almost single focus on sustained growth and profit maximization ultimately leads to entity non-sustainability by placing gross overpayments for assets above net asset fair market values on the balance sheet. That is, long term sustainability may be negatively impacted in entities that grossly overpay for net assets acquired above fair market value by showing such overpayments as assets versus period or transaction expenses. In concept, it could be said that managements and Boards of Directors are induced to grossly overpay for net assets acquired because there are material gains: enhanced enterprise valuations, positive stock price performance, an increased ability to borrow or raise other capital, and an ability to reward managers and employees with ever increasing 'in the money' options, etc. But the question remains, do such overpayments above fair market value for net assets acquired enhance or limit sustainability? Monga (2016) in The Wall Street Journal cites the work of economist Carol Corrado. Corrado shows that companies were investing approximately 14% of the private sector gross domestic product into non-physical assets (intangibles) in 2014. The investment in tangible assets (physical matter) in 2014 was approximately 10%. Corrado posits this was a reverse of the situation of 40 years ago where investment in tangible assets was 13%, and intangibles were 9%. Clearly technological advancements have had an impact in the type of investments made; but 40 years ago, goodwill had to be systematically amortized (expensed) over not more than 40 years -a dramatic difference with the goodwill impairment (expense) standards of today.
Why might managements see the gross over payment above fair market value for net assets acquired as a tool of value? Simply, when in the second half of the life cycle in any industry, it becomes harder and harder to capture new un-captured customers. Hence growing a top and bottom line via organic growth becomes much more arduous than in the first half. And, as Wall Street principally only rewards top and bottom line growth and market share gains, firms in maturing markets need to show growth and increases in the top line and bottom lines above all else. And with goodwill not having to be systematically expensed, managements have a window of opportunity to drive for the brass ring -top line and bottom line growth, with no concurrent material acquisition overpayment expenses.
This willingness to grossly overpay for net assets acquired above fair market value is even more likely so if CEO and CFO tenures are examined. Fortune Magazine reported that for the 500 largest companies in the U.S., the mean tenure for a CEO is 4.9 years (Sonnenfeld, 2015) , and for CFOs, The Wall Street Journal reported the mean tenure was 5.6 years (Monga, 2015) . Hardly a tenure long enough to worry about sustainability and the long term!
In the market as a function of time, if a primary focus on profit maximization is followed driven by an understanding of mean tenure times for senior officers, it almost universally will lead to corporate decline or demise -short term growth and profit maximization versus longer term sustainability via enhanced research and development efforts which have current period costs associated with such activities. And if we consider the life cycle of a business enterprise, here too we see relatively very short lives as in the mean tenure times of the CEO and CFO.
Senge (2013) The life expectancy of all firms regardless of size is 12.5 years. Based on Shell's criteria, only 40 corporations were discovered to have been in existence more than 150 years. (Shore, 2013) .
Eight (8) out of ten (10) entrepreneurs who start businesses fail within the first 18 months (Wagner, 2013) .
Larry Greiner of Harvard (1972) has written extensively over the years on the evolution and revolution of firms as they grow and mature. Greiner points out that in his model, the final stage in an enterprise's transition is a question mark. That is, the last stage is at the discretion of its respective business leaders -the entity does not in and of itself have to pass. Rather, the enterprise's next stage is decided by its leadership decisions. Will the leaders invest for the future, thereby creating a sustainable future? Or will they maximize near term growth and profits by buying like kind enterprises to capture customers and profits at a time when margins and growth are being squeezed, but pay well above fair market values for net assets acquired? Moreover, with the loose impairment rules of today regarding charges to goodwill, have the standard setters incentivized managements to overpay for intangibles by permitting such overpayments to reside on the balance sheet as an asset versus as an expense on the income statements (a debit is a debit)?
Bruce Henderson, the founder of the Boston Consulting Group (BCG, 1970) , provided another great model for determining when it is time to alter strategy (product or service offering mix) in order to sustain oneself (Reeves, et al, 2014) . Henderson developed this framework in the era of the conglomerate (a core component of the conglomerate dynamic was to balance counter cyclical businesses in order to optimize growth, profits and cash flows for the entire enterprise). What Henderson identified was that businesses should attempt to have a portfolio of companies/products/services wherein each strived to achieve market share and market growth. He realized that offerings would over time move into and out of market favor, and businesses needed to see this change and act accordingly in order to sustain themselves. Henderson developed his model on a min/max or hi/low quad (four box) framework. An adapted form of the Henderson model appears below: In the BCG modified model above, basically an asset reallocation model, the enterprise attempts to reallocate resources on a continuous basis to components where market share and growth opportunities are greatest -not necessarily to pump up top and bottom line growth via acquisitions of other mature or declining franchises for short term gains.
Conclusions and Recommendations
More assets on balance sheets today are of an intangible nature (including goodwill) than at any previous time. Clearly, technological changes may be at the center of this shift in asset form, but it also appears that accounting standards have created a large inducement for companies to 'puff the value wares' by permitting for an overpaying for net assets acquired in a business combination without such goodwill assets being systematically amortized (expensed).
Inasmuch as the impairment standards still provide wide discretion in their calculation even in the latest draft, in order to return to the accounting underpinning of making the conservative choice, it is recommended that a return to systematic amortization of goodwill replace the current impairment standard. Moreover, it is recommended that the systematic amortization of goodwill take place over a significantly shorter period than previously stipulated when life cycles tended to be longer. Here it is recommended that a Twenty (20) year amortization period become the standard. This shorter amortization period reflects the shorter life cycles of technology solutions, which often have life cycles of eighteen (18) months or less.
Additionally, the proposed systematic amortization of goodwill and possibly other intangibles should reduce the inducement for managements to acquire net assets for acquisition prices far above fair market values. 
